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SOUTH SANPITCH COMPANY, 
Plaintiff^Appellant, 
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DANIEL PACK, MARGARET A. 
GUNTERMAN, ACTION TITLE 
COMPANY, Trustee, T.P. FAMILY 
PARTNERSHIP, HOFFBUHER REDI-4 
MIX INC., WILLARD M. TUCKER, 
PHYLLIS 0. TUCKER, D LAND TITLE 
COMPANY, and all unknown 
persons who have or claim any 
right, title, estate, lien or 
interest in the subject 
property, 
Def endants-1 Respondents. 
Case No, 860239 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Proceedings Below 
The proceedings below are adequately set forth in 
plaintiff^appellant's principal brief and will not be restated 
here. 
Statement of Facts 
Plaintiff's statement of facts appears in its principal 
brief. The facts of this case are almost entirely undisputed. 
Plaintiff takes exception with a comment in defendant's 
statement of facts to the effect that neither the uniform real 
estate contract represented by exhibit 4, nor any notice of 
contract was recorded. The record is simply silent on that 
1 
issue. There is no evidence to support a conclusion that the 
contract or a notice of interest was not recorded. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant challenges plaintiff's arguments on two grounds: 
1) that the assignment of the interest of defendant Gunterman 
in the subject trust deed to defendant Pack did not constitute 
a "conveyance;1' and, 2) that defendant Pack did not purchase an 
interest in the real property. The basis for defendant's 
arguments is a statement in 59 C.J.S. Mortgages §196 that the 
interest of a beneficiary under a trust deed is personal 
property. The interest of a mortgagee is also personal 
property. Although a mortgagee or a beneficiary under a trust 
deed may not have a legal estate in the subject real property, 
nonetheless, the mortgagee or beneficiary does have an 
"interest" in the subject real property and the subsequent 
assignment thereof is a "conveyance" within the meaning of Utah 
Code Anno. §§57*1*1 and 57*3-3. Likewise, the mortgagee or 
beneficiary, as well as an assignee of the mortgagee or 
beneficiary, is a purchaser of the real property within the 
meaning of Utah Code Anno. .§57*3*3. 
Defendant has not challenged plaintiff's other arguments 
and consequently those arguments are not addressed in this 
brief. 
ARGUMENT 
THE ASSIGNMENT OF DEFENDANT GUNTERMAN'S INTEREST UNDER 
2 
THE SUBJECT DEED OF TRUST TO DEFENDANT PACK CONSTITUTED A 
CONVEYANCE OF AN INTEREST IN REAL ESTATE WITHIN THE MEANING 
OF UTAH CODE ANNO. §57*1*1 AND DEFENDANT PACK WAS A 
SUBSEQUENT PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH OF THE SUBJECT REAL 
ESTATE WITHIN THE MEANING OF UTAH CODE ANNO. §57-3-3. 
This appeal centers on the construction and effect of Utah 
Code Anno. §57-3*3 which reads as follows: 
Every conveyance of real estate hereafter made, which 
shall not be recorded as provided in this title, shall be 
void as against any subsequent purchaser in good faith and 
for valuable consideration of the same real estate, or any 
portion thereof, where his own conveyance shall be first 
duly recorded. 
Plaintiff argues that the assignment of the subject trust 
deed by defendant Gunterman to defendant Pack was a conveyance 
of real estate and that defendant Pack was a subsequent 
purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration of the same 
real estate within the meaning of Utah Code Anno. §57-*3**3. 
Accordingly, plaintiff's title would then be subject to the 
interest of defendant Pack inasmuch as the deed of partial 
release and reconveyance was recorded after the recordation of 
the assignment by defendant Gunterman to defendant Pack. The 
defendant opposes plaintiff's argument on two grounds which are 
essentially the same: 1) that the assignment of the trust 
deed from defendant Gunterman to defendant Pack was not a 
"conveyance"; and, 2) that defendant Pack was not a purchaser 
of "the same real estate" within the meaning of Utah Code Anno. 
§57-3^3. The defendant argues that the interest of defendant 
Gunterman was personal property and that, therefore, an 
assignment of the same did not constitute a conveyance of real 
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estate, nor did it constitute defendant Pack a purchaser of 
real estate. Plaintiff cites as authority for that proposition 
59 C.J.S. Mortgages §196 which states: 
The cestui que trust, or beneficiary in a deed of trust 
given as security for a debt has no title to, or estate 
in, the property covered by the deed, or at least he has 
no legal title or ownership and it has been held that he 
has no equitable title, but a holding to the contrary has 
also been made. He has only a lien or a secured chose in 
action, and he has an interest only to the extent that he 
can cause the trustee to sell the land and apply the 
proceeds to the payment of the secured debt. Such 
interest is personal property. 
It is not contended that either a mortagee or a 
beneficiary under a trust deed holds a legal estate in the real 
property. However, the lien imposed by the mortgage or trust 
deed gives the mortgagee or beneficiary under a trust deed an 
interest in the real estate within the meaning of Utah Code 
Anno. §57-*l-l. That section reads as follows: 
The term "conveyance" as used in this title shall be 
construed to embrace every instrument in writing by which 
any real estate, or interest in real estate, is created, 
aliened, mortgaged, encumbered or assigned, except wills, 
and leases for a term not exceeding one year. (Emphasis 
added.) 
If this court were to adopt the rationale of defendant 
that the beneficiary of a trust deed has no interest in the 
real estate, then the court would have to hold that the 
recording statute, Utah Code Anno. §57*3-43, does not apply to 
mortgages. In 59 C.J.S. Mortgages §195, it states: 
A mortgage of property is not itself, real property, but 
is personal property, it being considered in some states 
as a mere chose in action. So too, for most purposes, the 
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right or interest of the mortgagee under the mortgage is 
regarded as personal property 
If the mortgagee's interest were determined to be personal 
property for purposes of Utah Code Anno. §57-0^3, then there 
would be no record priority of mortgages because subsequent 
mortgagees would not be considered purchasers "of the same real 
estate." However, that is obviously not the law. A mortgagee 
is considered to be a purchaser of the real estate and his 
mortgage lien has priority over subsequently recorded 
mortgages. In Federal Land Bank of Berkeley v. Pace, 87 Utah 
156, 48 P.2d 480 (1935) the court stated: 
There is no question but that a mortgage lien is included 
in the term "conveyance" as used in §78*3-^ 3, and that a 
mortgagee is a purchaser, and the law of priority of 
record, in its general principle, applies to mortgages as 
well as deeds. 
48 P.2d at 482. Section 78-0-0, cited by the court, refers to 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, and is identical to the current 
Utah Code Anno. §57-3-*3 quoted above. Consequently, a 
mortgagee and a beneficiary of a trust deed are purchasers of 
real estate within the meaning of Utah Code Anno. §57*3*3, and 
a purchaser of a mortgage or beneficial interest under a trust 
deed is also a purchaser of the same real estate. 
In Kemp v. Zions First National Bank, 24 Utah 2d 288, 470 
P.2d 390 (1970) the court discussed the relative priorities of 
a purchase money mortgage granted to the seller, and a later 
executed, but earlier recorded, trust deed granted to a bank. 
The court therein equated a trust deed with a mortgage and 
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observed that the vendor, who executed a warranty deed and took 
back a mortgage, "retained and interest in the property." 
We have been shown no authority which approves giving 
preference to a purchase money mortgagee ...: where such 
claimants had given an unrestricted warranty deed, knowing 
that the financing bank was going to rely on it; where the 
bank had neither actual nor constructive knowledge that 
the vendor retained an interest in the property, and the 
latter, who had failed to record their own mortgage, in 
full knowledge of the facts, went to the bank and in 
effect approved the transaction by accepting their share 
of the proceeds therefrom, but without disclosing that 
they retained an interest. (Emphasis added.) 
470 P.2d at 393. 
The court's finding in both Pace and Kemp that a mortgagee 
has an interest in the real property, effectuates the purpose 
of the recording statutes. The purpose of the recording 
statutes is to put persons dealing with a particular property 
on notice of outstanding interests which may have attached 
thereto. It cannot be disputed that the priority of a mortgage 
is determined in relation to when it was recorded. 
Subsequently recorded mortgages are subject to prior recorded 
mortgages. The same is true with respect to an assignment of a 
mortgage or trust deed. The assignee of the mortgage or trust 
deed is entitled to rely upon the record to determine the 
priority of the mortgage or trust deed being assigned as well 
as its validity. Defendant Pack was entitled to rely upon the 
state of the record at the time he received and paid for an 
assignment of defendant Gunterman's beneficial interest under 
the trust deed. As noted in plaintiff's principal brief, the 
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recordation of an assigment of a mortgage or trust deed puts 
the world on notice of the interest of the assignee. If the 
fee title holder thereafter obtains a release from the original 
mortgagee, and subsequently sells the property, the buyer takes 
it subject to the interest of the assignee of the mortgagee. 
Utah Code Anno. §57*1*36 provides in part that an 
"assignment of a beneficial interest under a trust deed, ... 
shall be entitled to be recorded, and shall, from the time of 
filing the same with the recorder for record, impart notice of 
the contents thereof to all persons, including subsequent 
purchasers and encumbrancers for value...." In 89 ALR 190 it 
states: 
The recording of the assignment operates as notice to all 
of the assignee's rights as against any subsequent acts of 
the mortgagee affecting the mortgage. Thus, it protects 
them against a subsequent assignment of the mortgage. 
It also protects him against a subsequent and unauthorized 
discharge and release of the mortgage by the mortgagee. 
Defendant is attempting to persuade the court that the 
recordation of an assignment of the beneficial interest under a 
trust deed does not affect the real property and that therefore 
the recordation of such an assignment is meaningless. 
Obviously that position is without merit in light of the 
provisions of Utah Code Anno. §57^1^36. 
In any event, the assignment of the trust deed from 
defendant Gunterman to defendant Pack was an assignment of an 
interest in real estate pursuant to Utah Code Anno. §57*1-1 and 
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hence was a "conveyance" within the meaning of Utah Code Anno. 
§57^3-3. Consequently, plaintiff's title to the subject 
property was encumbered by the interest of defendant Pack 
because pursuant to Utah Code Anno. §57*3-3, the partial 
reconveyance by the trustee was void as to defendant Pack's 
interest. Therefore, plaintiff was required to bring an action 
to quiet title to the subject property and is entitled to 
damages against defendant D Land Title Company as outlined more 
fully in plaintiff's principal brief. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, plaintiff respectfully requests 
that the court reverse the judgment of the lower court with 
respect to plaintiff's claims against defendant 3D Land Title 
Company and enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and against 
defendant D Land Title Company in the sum of $2,300 plus 
accrued interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of 
judgment. 
Dated: dllltU^t^ & 1986. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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